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1MEMBER 1976 



Approved for public release; 
distribution unlimited. 


Boar. >. 


ACN 76056 

. / 


The views of the author do not purport to reflect the positions of the 
Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. 





The US-Israeli “special relationship” has drawn the United States 
into a closer and more direct involvement in the Middle East. This 
memorandum analyzes the basis for the US-Israeli connection and 
various plausible options for the form and structure of future US-lsraeli 
relations. The author indicates that, in the absence of a comprehensive 
peace settlement, formalization of the relationship is unlikely in order 
to retain US flexibility with both Arabs and Israelis. However, 
ultimately, some form of formal US bilateral alliance may evolve, 
possibly involving US military forces in conjunction with a final peace 
settlement. Such a bilateral arrangement would be supplemental to a 
multilateral guarantee involving both “superpowers” and perhaps UN 
peace observers. In any case, he concludes unless Israel undermines its 
American public support, the US-Israeli connection will continue to be 
very close, and perhaps even grow stronger. 

The Military Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic 
Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a means for timely 
dissemination of analytical papers which are not necessarily constrained 
by format or conformity with institutional policy. These memoranda 
' are prepared on subjects of current importance in areas related to the 

author’s professional work or interests. 

This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of 
national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the 
official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the 
Department of Defense. 


MAJOR HOWARD L. CHAMBERS has been assigned to the Strategic Studies 
Institute since 1974. He is a graduate of Florida State University and holds a 
bachelor’s degree in government, and master’s degrees in international relations 
and in public administration. Major Chambers has been assigned to various 
command and staff positions in air defense units in the United States, Greece, and 
Korea, and served on the Army Staff in South Vietnam. He is a graduate of the 
US Army Command and General Staff College. Major Chambers is a specialist in 
the Middle Eastern affairs and his work has been published in a compendium of 
articles on national security and detente. 


Steadfast US support for the State of Israel, a keystone of US 
Middle East policy for over 30 years, seems inconsistent and 
contradictory when considered in the context of overall US interests 
and objectives in the region. The basis of the US-Israeli relationship is 
extralegal, not found in formal bilateral treaties or documents, and only 
surfaces in the public and private statements of Presidents and other 
government officials and in the platforms of competing political parties. 
The nature of the relationship is ambiguous, lacking precise definition 
and explicit parameters. In the words of one analyst, Israel is “. . . not 
quite an ally; in some respects it is a client, but it is in no sense a 
puppet of the United States.”! Nonetheless, the ties that bind these 
two states are strong and durable-possibly unbreakable-having 
withstood the strains of four wars, domestic political and economic 
pressures, and strong international criticism. To many observers, the 
US-Israeli connection appears to possess its own dynamism which seems 
to be drawing the United States almost inexhorably into an increasingly 
direct involvement in the complexities of the volatile Middle East and 
the attendant dangers of future oil embargoes and possible superpower 

In recent years, especially since 1973, with Israel’s increasing 


diplomatic isolation and dependence on the United States, Americans 
have begun to take a more pragmatic and analytic view of US policy in 
support of Israel. Prior to 1973, unquestioning US support was 
practically axiomatic. However, the oil embargo awakened the public to 
the direct costs of continuing such a policy, and there is a growing 
realization in the United States and Israel of the constraints operating 
on their relationship. Some analysts have noted indications that US 
support for Israel is eroding. Although the course of US-Israeli relations 
has seldom run smoothly, to some they seem “rockier than usual these 
days.” Because the United States has been unable to sufficiently 
influence Israeli policies and actions and Israel fears that the United 
States may sacrifice its interests in Israel for its need for Arab oil, a 
mutual distrust between the two states exists. One analyst has 
characterized their association as “a contradictory relationship of two 
close friends who don’t quite trust each other yet don’t want, or can’t 
afford, to part.” 2 

Despite increasing critical analyses of the US-Israeli connection, the 
“special relationship” continues essentially as former Secretary of State 
William P. Rogers succinctly summarized in 1970: 

It is in our best interest to be sure that Israel survives as a nation. That has 
been our policy, and that will continue to be our policy. So we have to 
take whatever action we think is necessary to give them the assurance they 
need that their independence and sovereignty is going to continue.3 

President Gerald R. Ford reiterated this policy shortly after taking 
office in 1974 when he assured Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin that 
. . we shall continue to stand by Israel. We are committed to Israel’s 
survival and security.” 4 He thereby joined virtually every President 
since Harry Truman in firmly committing the United States to Israel’s 
survival, and the Congress has consistently underwritten that pledge 
with large amounts of economic and military assistance. 

The future direction of US-Israeli relations has been the subject of 
considerable speculation. While some have suggested the need to 
weaken or sever the connection, others have advocated strengthening, 
even formalizing, the relationship as a means of achieving peace in the 
Arab- Israeli dispute. The subject elicits strong emotions and biases 
which makes dispassionate and objective analyses difficult. The emotive 
nature of the subject notwithstanding, this paper will trace the 
evolution of the US-Israeli connection, examine the nature of the 
relationship, and project the most likely course it will take in the 




Prior to World War II, the United States had little interest in the 
affairs of the Middle East, except for the nurturing of a rapidly 
developing oil industry. The Middle East and the problems of Palestine 
were considered the responsibility of the British. However, during the 
war, especially from 1942, the US Government came increasingly under 
the pressure of a well-organized worldwide Zionist organization 
operating through the American Jewish community. The Zionists 
sought US support for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. 
The 1944 election campaign witnessed sympathetic expressions of 
support for Zionist objectives (by both political parties), the growth of 
public support for the Jews, and President Roosevelt’s endorsement of 
the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. These events created 
considerable concern in the US oil industry and in the State and 
Defense Departments where US economic and strategic interests were 
feared jeopardized. Thus were sown the seeds of the domestic political 
and economic conflict over US interests in the Middle East which grew 
to create the internal trauma associated with US Middle East policy for 
over 30 years. 5 

Although support for the Jewish state grew in US public and 
political circles, the United States resisted British attempts, following 
World War II, to be drawn into a more active and responsible role in the 
Middle East. President Harry Truman believed that “the long-term fate 
of Palestine was the kind of problem we have the UN for.” 6 Early US 
policy, therefore, was to work through the United Nations or to serve 
as mediator in the Palestine problems but to avoid direct involvement. 
However, with die postwar collapse of British Middle East policy and 
diminishing British influence in die eastern Mediterranean and Middle 
East in 1947, a power vacuum was created into which the Soviet Union 
attempted to expand. 7 The United States responded to Soviet 
expansionism with the Truman Doctrine which embodied the US 
determination to contain the spread of communism. This determination 
led the United States to assume its first direct and large-scale 
responsibility for events in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle 
East. Thus, superimposed upon US regional interests in oil and the 
establishment of the Jewish state was a third competing interest-the 
containment of Soviet expansionism. This desire to keep the Soviet 
Union out of the Middle East has remained a major touch-stone of 
overall American foreign policy. 8 However, the realization of this 


objective was complicated by the advent of the nuclear era, which 
increased the risk of pursuing superpower policies in the region and 
concomitantly increased the desire of both to avoid direct 

On May 14, 1948, the establishment of the State of Israel was 
proclaimed and the United States became the first state to extend de 
facto recognition to the provisional government. Almost immediately 
the Arab armies moved against Israel with the avowed goal of 
exterminating the new state and, simultaneously, the US interest was 
transformed from establishing the Jewish state to that of preserving it 
and ensuring its survival. The de facto recognition of Israel established 
the formal beginnings of the US-Israeli connection, and the 1948 
conflict marked the formal commencement of the Arab-Israeli disputes 
which have been the central focus of US and Soviet Middle East policies 
for over 30 years. 

The Soviet Union has built its political and military position in the 
Middle East since the mid-1950’s through a diplomacy of polarization 
developed around the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States, on the 
other hand, has pursued the reactive diplomacy of antipolarization, 
frequently called the policy of “evenhandedness.” The United States 
backed Israel without formal guarantee, but with implied assurance that 
it would not allow the destruction of the state, while continuing its 
policy of attempting to maintain friendly relations with the Arab states 
through economic and technical assistance programs. 9 A recent 
Brookings Institution study reiterated this duplex approach in US 
policy: “The United States has a strong interest in the security, 
independence, and well-being of Israel and the Arab states of the area 
and in the friendship of both.”* 0 Although evenhandedness is not 
meant to indicate absolute equality in quantities of assistance, the Arab 
states tend to view it in terms of absolute balance, and have difficulty 
understanding the policy when US economic assistance to Israel from 
1948 to 1974 totaled $1,292 million and tax-exempt private 
contributions from American Jews averaged $72 million per year. 
During the same period, US economic assistance to the Arab states 
totaled $2,002 million, l 1 On a per capita and a per state basis, the level 
of US support provided to Israel and the Arabs has clearly favored 
Israel in an effort to establish military parity and its economic 

For over three decades, the primary US objective has been the 
establishment of a stable peace in the region. President Ford stated that 


the United States has two primary Middle East objectives: “First, we 

seek peace Second, we desire a strong mutually beneficial 

relationship with every nation in the Middle East.” 1 ^ The US interest 
in achieving a stable peace has been described as a “vital interest” by 
the Brookings Institution, 13 and Henry Kissinger has said that “There 
is no alternative to the full and active engagement of the United States 
in the diplomacy of peace in the Middle East.”** The United States has 
been involved in a variety of programs seeking to achieve peace in the 
region since 1948, including the Palestine Conciliation Commission, the 
Tripartite Declaration of 1950, various UN peace initiatives, twonation 
and four-nation peace efforts, the Rogers plans, and the Kissinger 
step-by-step diplomacy. Througiout these three decades, the 
steadfastness of the US-Israeli connection has endured. Kissinger has 
said that: 

. . . one of the principal ingredients of peace must be the steadfastness that 

contributed decisively to the creation of the State of Israel, a steadfastness 

which has helped protect Israel’s security for ewer a quarter of a century, a 

steadfastness on which Israel can rely in the future. 15 


The following are generally agreed to constitute the catalog of US 
interests in the Middle East: 

• Avoiding confrontation with the Soviet Union. 

• Preventing the establishment of Soviet regional hegemony. 

• Contin uing access to oil at reasonable prices for the United States, 
West Europe, and Japan. 

• The survival of Israel. 

• Preventing polarization of regional powers along ideological lines 
thus inviting external intervention. 

• a « i«ting regional states to move forward on national development. 

• Establishing a stable and durable peace in the region. While 
essential agreement exists on what American interests are in the Middle 
East, there is a lack of agreement as to “the priority of these interests 
and the appropriate means of reconciling them where they conflict.” 16 

National interests are usually prioritized according to the categories 
of “vital ” “major,” and “other.” Here again, no precise definition of 
these terms exists. Former Senator J. W. Fulbright has suggested that a 
vital interest is “anything which pertains directly to our national 


raani. * - . ' - ’ 


survival, or short of that, something materially discernible pertinent to 
the security and well-being of the people.”! 7 The difflcultices in 
operationalizing this broad definition are apparent. A better definition 
is offered by Bernard Brodie, who considers a vital interest one which 
directly affects the continued existence of the nation and its 
institutions as perceived by its leadership and represents their subjective 
judgments about important foreign policy issues.! * While this 
definition is also difficult to operationalize, it suggests some important 
characteristics of a vital interest: 

• It directly involves life and death of the society and its 

• It is subjective. 

• It is established by the nation’s leadership. 

• Its perception may be affected by the existing domestic and 
international environment. Therefore, perceptions of vital interests, and 
indeed of all national interests, are subject to change, not capricously, 
but responsively, as significant changes occur in the domestic and 
international environment over time. 

From World War II through October 1973, the United States 
generally afforded to its interest in Israel a higher priority than to its 
other interests in the Middle East. It was implicitly, but not officially, a 
vital interest. A small minority of dissenting voices was faintly 
discernible in this period, but it was not until the effects of the Arab oil 
embargo were experienced by the American public and pressure from 
allies was brought to bear that serious and very audible challenges to 
the traditional priority of interests became evident and indications of 
an “erosion” of US support for Israel became apparent. The Arab 
employment of the oil weapon struck at what may v.>ell be the basic 
dilemma in US Middle East interests- the inherent dilemma between 
idealism and pragmatism. Professor Eugene Rostow of Yale believes 
that the problem of our policy priorities in the region requires “a 
national, and not a sentimental or a partisan, approach. What is at stake 
for us . . . should be examined in the perspective of the national 
interest, not of sympathy for either the Arabs or the Israelis.”! 9 Henry 
Kissinger also subscribes to this view as is apparent from a conversation 
he had with the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia: 

. . . Our best argument is not to say that we’re anti-Israeli or pro- Arab, but 

that we want peace in the Middle East and that we’re pursuing the interests 

of the United States. If we try to put it on the basis of the merits of the 


£ -H 




* ■ 

'1 '•* 

i r 

Arab-Israeli dispute, there will always be more people defending Israel than 
the Arab side. So we have to put it in terms of American national 

J. W. Fulbright considers the US interest in Israel “emotional and 
ideological” 2 1 and contends that “access to oil is the greater of our 
interests in the Middle East, a vital interest, whereas our commitment 
to Israel is a less-than-vital interest.” 22 While stating that it is not 
necessary to sacrifice one interest for the other, he believes that, 
because of the growing US dependency on Arab oil, the practical 
approach is to give priority to access to oil while endeavoring to 
reconcile both interests. Others also subscribe to this thesis and even 
suggest that the United States divorce itself from its de facto 
commitment to Israel as a practical matter of economics and in the 
interest of world peace and stability. 

Another aspect of the dilemma of US interests in the Middle East 
involves the paradoxical relationship between the US support for Israel 
and its desire to prevent expansion of Soviet influence and to avoid 
superpower confrontation situations in the region. The principal basis 
of Soviet influence in the region has been the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
conflict has presented the opportunity for expanding Soviet influence 
which has been compounded by US steadfast support foT Israel. A 
peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli disputes would significantly 
diminish Soviet influence in the Middle East. On the other hand, 
continued US political and military support for Israel significantly 
contributes to continued Soviet presence and influence in the Middle 
East, arms buildups, and potential for superpower confrontation. 

Despite these apparent conflicts in US interests and increasing calls 
for a more pragmatic approach to US policy in the Middle East, the 
US-Israeli connection remains strong, viable, and a principal element in 
US Middle East policies. What accounts for the strength and durability 
of this special relationship? Upon what is the American commitment to 
Israel based? 


The unique historical relationship that exists between the United 
States and Israel is not easily understood or explained in terms of 
tangible linkages. Rather, the ties that bind these two states are 
founded on more abstruse factors. For purposes of this discussion, the 
various aspects of this relationship will be examined under the 


m Mi 

categories of ideological, political, economic, military, cultural, and 

Ideological aspects. Many Americans believe that the US-Israeli 
relationship is based on mutual ideological affinities. According to 
Franz Shurmann, “No United States commitment more exemplifies 
democratic imperialism than that to Israel.” 2 3 Until the early 1970’s, 
Shurmann asserts the commitment to Isr'«l “was clearly ideological." 
He suggests that “Israel was a democu.ic experiment in a feudal 
backwater which would someday spread light and progress to the entire 
Middle East” and that it exemplified the Democratic Party’s consistent 
ideology “that a progressive, socialist, pro-American and 

non-Communist state could arise.” 24 It is also frequently asserted in 
American academic and political circles that Israel is the most 
democratically-styled state in the Middle East and that a commonality 
of ideological purposes exists between the United States and Israel. On 
June 1 1, 1975, President Ford stated that the basis of the fundamental 
US-Israeli relationship was the sharing of a desire for the fundamental 
human values of freedom, independence, and the right of each 
individual to live in peace. 25 It has been reiterated on numerous 
occasions by US and Israeli leaders that the two countries share a deep 
devotion to democratic ideals. Furthermore, Henry Kissinger has 
asserted that “Israel and the United States are bound together in 
common purposes-a world envisaged in the Charter of the United 
Nations, a world in which the resort to force becomes unnecessary and 
disputes are resolved by peaceful means. ”2 6 it seems clear that the 
United States perceives an ideological linkage with the State of 

Political aspects. Probably the single most significant clement of the 
US-Israeli connection is the US domestic political factor. The 
connection to Israel is particularly strong in domestic US politics due to 
the high level of political activism characteristic of the American Jewish 
Community. John C. Campbell has stated: 

The organized Jewish Community exerts a potential influence not 
primarily in votes . . . but rather in its financial contributions to political 
causes and in prominence of its members in the media of communication 
and other fields of public and private life. Its voice comes through loud and 
clear at the White House and in the Congress. This is a political ieality. 2 7 

The American Jewish Community is a very powerful “political reality” 
in US domestic politics. The Jewish population constitutes slightly less 


'ia i-vm— u. 

than 3 percent of the total American population or about six million 
people. Dr. Alfred Lilienthal, editor of Middle East Perspective, observes 
that 85 percent of the Jewish population is concentrated in 16 cities in 
5 states-New York, California, Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, which 
collectively cast a total of 164 of the 270 electoral votes required to 
elect a President 28 While the inference that the Jewish vote is the 
major element in electing Presidents is ludicrous, American Jews do 
tend to be very politically active and have very high voting participation 
percentages. For this reason, the Jewish vote, which comprises only 4 
percent of the total national vote, is actively sought by both parties. 
However, the Jewish Community is not politically monolithic and is 
not unanimous in its support of US political candidates, Israel, or 
Zionism. Nonetheless, every Presidential campaign since 1948 has 
found both parties’ platforms solidly behind Israel and, in the 1976 
campaign, no candidate declared or implied opposition to Israel. Jews 
have also served in senior positions of the administrations of both 
parties and provide a large number of Capitol Hill staffers. Presently, 
Jews serving in high positions include Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger; Attorney General Edward Levi; Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisors, Alan Greenspan; and Arthur Bums, Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve. There have also been several Jewish Justices of the 
Supreme Court- Brandeis, Cardozo, Frankfurter, and Goldberg. 
Although they do not tun for political office in large numbers, there are 
3 Jewish Senators, 20 Representatives in the House, and 2 State 
Governors. 29 

Perhaps a more important political influence of the American Jewish 
Community is the financial contribution it makes to political 
candidates. In the last two Presidential elections, according to I. L. 
Kenan, Chairman of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC), Jewish contributors donated more than half of the 
contributions of $10,000 and larger to Democratic candidates. 30 
Individuals, neighborhood groups, and local Jewish organizations 
contribute heavily to political campaigns. It is not only the Jewish vote, 
but also the Jewish money that political parties seek. 

Finally, a very strong political force influencing the US domestic 
political scene in favor of Israel is the AIPAC, an umbrella group for 
Jewish lobbying for Israel. 31 The lobby blends a well-staffed and 
articulate professional group in Washington with the normally 
undirected articulation of Jewish sentiment nationwide. According to 
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak of The Washington Post, its efforts 

are covertly directed from Israel. 32 AIPAC is generally considered a 
strong and persuasive political influence and its success is generally 
attributed to a combination of US national interests, widespread public 
support, Jewish community activism, and an effective Washington 
operation. 3 3 The pervasive support of the general American populace, 
however, is critical to the effectiveness of the operation. Without this 
base of support, the Israeli case would be considerably weaker in 
Congress. In recent years much has been heard about the “erosion” of 
popular support for Israel. However, Leslie Gelb of The New York 
Times surveyed Congress extensively in 1974 and found that it was 
“not less pro-Israel” and that there was no apparent threat to 
traditional congressional support for Israel. 34 A Harris poll completed 
in January 197S indicated that, rather than slipping, support for Israel 
was at 52 percent, a record peak.3S Admittedly, polls, are not always 
the most accurate measures of true public opinion and then results 
frequently conflict. However, polls taken over the years have tended to 
confirm the support of the American public for Israel. Kissinger, when 
asked about eroding public support, remarked “. . . Abba Eban once 
told me that Israel considered objectivity 100 percent agreement with 
their point of view.” Kissinger went on to say that “although there has 
been a deterioration of general US willingness to give foreign aid, I 
think Israel has suffered less from that deterioration than almost any 
other country. ”36 Generally, public and congressional support for 
Israel has not “eroded,” but reflects an evolving awareness of the 
broader issues involved and a greater appreciation of the Arab 

The strength of US political support for Israel is reflected in the 
actions of the Congress in recent years. On May 26, 1970, 71 Senators 
wrote to Secretary of State Rogers urging shipment of jets to Israel and, 
in 1973, 70 Senators and 264 Representatives cosponsored resolutions 
calling for additional jets for Israel. 3 7 On May 22, 1975, 76 Senators 
sent a letter to President Ford urging him to “make it clear” that the 
United States “stands firmly with Israel” by, among other things, 
supporting “a level of military and economic support adequate to deter 
a renewal of war by Israel’s neighbors.” 3 8 In 1946, President Harry 
Truman stated very succinctly the essence of US political support for 
Israel past and present when, in opposition to State Department 
advisors on the issue of supporting the creation of a Jewish state, he 
said, “I’m sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of 
thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism: I do not have 


hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.” 39 The 
domestic political influence available to Israel in the United States is a 
major element in the strength and durability of the US-Israeli 
connection. It also has significant impact on the making of US policy. 
Edward Sheehan, in stating to a Kissinger aide that Israel’s American 
constituency is the greatest constraint upon US policy, reports that the 
aide replied, “Of course. And the constraint becomes the 
determinant.” 40 

Israel has become increasingly diplomatically isolated in the 
international community which has increased her political and 
economic dependence on the United States. This situation has given the 
United States considerable political leverage over Israel and that 
leverage was employed during the October 1973 War, the 1974 
disengagement talks, and in the 1975 Sinai discussions. However, that 
leverage is complicated by Israeli national pride and a distrust of US 

Economic aspects. The Israeli economy, since 1973, has been in 
serious trouble with inflation running at 20-30 percent; a balance of 
payments deficit of about $4 billion; and diminished growth in the 
GNP, though it is still increasing at a rate of about 5 percent. 4 • The 
United States is the principal external source of funds for Israel. The 
1973 oil embargo and the Arab trade blacklist reduced Israel’s foreign 
trade receipts and increased its economic dependence on the United 
States. The United States has provided $2.8 billion in economic 
assistance including about $650 million in Food for Peace (Public Law 
480) to Israel since 1948, 42 and plans to provide $819 million, 
including $9 million in food imports and $25 million for housing loan 
guarantees for fiscal year 1977. 43 Although US-Israeli trade is not 
significant in the overall context of US trade, it is very important to 
Israel. The United States in 1974 remained Israel’s largest supplier with 
a market share of 18 percent. With the signing of the 1975 Sinai 
agreement, Israel has become increasingly dependent on the United 
States for economic support-especially in the area of petroleum. 

In addition to US economic assistance and trade, the American 
Jewish Community is also a significant source of additional funds for 
Israel. A strong empathetic connection between Jews in the United 
States, and elsewhere in the world, exists with the state of Israel. The 
desire to help is strong and, facilitated by a tax exemption granted to 
US charities, the Jewish Community funnels large amounts of money to 
Israel through the United Jewish Appeal (UJA). Between 1948 and 


^ -r. -- : -fiw. 

1971, the UJA provided almost $1,654 million to Israel. The American 
Jewish Joint Distribution Center also invested over $200 million in its 
programs in Israel for the same period. Another valuable source of 
funds has been the five State of Israel Bond issues floated world-wide 
since 1951, of which American Jews bought $1,588 million. 

Philanthropic programs by American Jewish agencies have also been an 
important source of funds for Israel’s economy. 44 The magnitude of 
the US Government investment and that of the American Jewish 
Community are important aspects of the US-lsraeli connection. 

Military aspects. The US military commitment to Israel’s security 
has been expensive in terms of cost, risk, and US readiness. Until 1962, 

Britain, West Germany, and France were the principal suppliers of 
military equipment to Israel. However, with the sale of HAWK air 
defense missiles in 1962, the United States entered the market and, 
after the 1967 war, was the only major source of arms to which Israel 
could turn. From 1962 until 1975, the United States provided Israel 
with a total of $4.2 billion in military assistance 45 and will provide 
$1.5 billion in fiscal year 1976 and probably another $1 billion will be 
requested for 1977. Therefore, by 1977, the total US military 
investment will be almost $7 billion. Of this total, $1.5 billion are 
grants and $750 million of the fiscal year 1977 request will be forgiven. 

In becoming the principal supplier of arms to Israel, the United 
States risked confrontation with the Soviet Union and possible nuclear 
war twice-in 1967 and 1973. To a Soviet threat of military 
intervention in 1967, President Johnson moved the US Sixth Fleet to 
within 50 miles of the Syrian coast and, in October 1973, a worldwide 
alert of US forces was ordered in response to a similar Soviet threat. 

Thus, history records at least two instances where the United States 
demonstrated an intention to come to the active military assistance of 
Israel even to point of confrontation with the USSR. In addition, the 

Israeli requirements following the 1973 war were so great that, in order s 

to meet them, the United States drew equipment from military stocks 
in Europe and from reserve units thus risking degradation of its own 
readiness posture. These events demonstrate the intensity of the US 

commitment to Israeli security. Furthermore, US support for Israel has ■£ 

also created conflict with the European Allies and Japan and an 
increasing US isolation in the United Nations. The conflict between the 

essentiality of oil for the NATO Allies and the US commitment to % 

Israel has created tensions within the Alliance that have been divisive 
and disintegrative. The United Nations vote on the issues of Zionism 


and Israeli membership typifies the increasing strength of anti-Israeli 
forces and the increasing isolation of the United States because of its 
support for Israel. 

Cultural aspects. The US-Israeli connection is also influenced by a 
cultural-psychological web established between the American public 
and Israel. President Ford said, “The United States and Israel 
share ... a special opportunity as two kindred peoples, and common 
moral and political values that flow from the great Judeo-Christian 
heritage.” 46 American Jews feel an ethnic and religious affinity for the 
Jews of Israel and their attachment has, in various ways, worked to 
draw the two countries closer to each other. Many American Jews have 
friends and family living in Israel. Their massive financial support, 
emigration, and frequent pilgrimages have strengthened the cultural and 
economic linkage through direct infusion of funds into die Israeli 
economy. Indirectly Urey have been instrumental in strengthening the 
cultural linkage by the importation of American movies, books, and 
music, which have also contributed to the Israeli economy and to 
making Israel one of the most “Americanized” and America-conscious 
countries in the world. The American Jewish cultural aspect of the 
US-tsraeli relationship has also had impact on Israeli political decisions. 
The Israeli Government has been careful not to take, except under 
extreme circumstances, any action which would alienate the support of 
the American Jewish Community. 

The American public, in general, identifies with the Israeli 
pioneering spirit, which is reminiscent of their own historical frontier 
experience. Americans also have a natural tendency to support the 
underdog wherever found-in sports or politics. Prime Minister Rabin 
was undoubtedly aware of this American cultural trait when, on a 
recent US visit, he said, “And if there is something that symbolizes 
Israel today, it is the spirit of David facing Goliath ... I believe that 
this is what is significant in Israel today, the spirit of David seeking 
peace and, at the same time, being ready and capable to meet some 
Goliath.” 47 

Aside from the obvious religious association between American Jews 
and Israel, there is also an awareness amonp American Christians, 
engendered by a common Judeo-Christian heritage, that a religious 
linkage with Israel exists. Many in the American Christian Community 
see a close religious connection between the present State of Israel and 
the Israel of the Old Testament and Biblical prophesy. They believe 
that the words of the Prophet Ezekial were fulfilled in (948, “Behold, I 


j. . 

will take the people of Israel from the nations among which they have 
gone . . . and bring them to their own land; and I will make them one 
nation in the land, upon the mountains of Israel . . .” 48 Furthermore, 
they believe that events since 1948 have fulfilled the message of 
Obadiah, “Behold, I will make you small among nations, you shall be 
utterly despised.” 49 Some also believe that failure to support Israel by 
any nation will bring divine punishment as recorded in die apocalyptic 
writing of Zechariah, “And on that day I will seek to destroy ail the 
nations that come against Jerusalem.” 50 The messianic tradition 
fundamental to the Christian faith also accounts for the close affinity 
that the Christian Community feels for Israel and its concern for the 
future of the Israeli state. 

A final cultural aspect of the US-Israeli relationship involves the 
tendency of Americans to categorize or group people according to the 
force of kinship between them- along such lines as culture, religion, and 
ethnicity. The New Yorker magazine observed that: “The true reason 
we are loyal to Israel- and the reason our involvement with her is 
different from that of Vietnam-may be that Israel is a member of our 
extended family, of our tribe...” 51 Perhaps this is what Henry 
Kissinger had in mind when he said “. . . given the special relationship 
and affection that exists between us and Israel, our 
disagreements ... are in nature of family quarrels.” 52 Few Americans 
would admit to this kindred relationship because it seems irrational and 
smacks of “Archie Bunkerism,” but those who have travelled to 
disparate cultural areas of the world are aware of the existence of this 

Moral aspects. The United States has recognized an “historical and 
moral” commitment to Israel which has roots in the Nazi holocaust of 
World War II. All Western states felt a degree of guilt and moral 
obligation following the war, which culminated in the establishment of 
the State of Israel. This was especially true of the United States, which 
stands as a bulwark of democracy, a refuge from persecution, and the 
most humanitarian nation in history. As J. W. Fulbright has said, “Israel 
if a creation of the conscience of the West, particularly that of the 
United States.” 55 Henry Kissinger has declared that the United States 
is “convinced that Israel’s survival is inseparable from the future of 
human dignity, and we shall never forget that Israel’s security has a 
special claim on the conscience of mankind.” Furthermore, Kissinger 
says that the United States and Israel are bound together, not by legal 
documents, but by “a moral connection which cannot be severed." 54 


It is clear that the nature of the US-Israeli relationship and the basis 
upon which it rests is the result of the interaction of diverse domestic 
factors in both countries. This examination reveals that the US-Israeli 
linkage is a strong connection, and it is built upon intangible, often 
unexplainable, but very durable foundations. The key factors 
accounting for the strength of the connection appear to be the specific 
support of the American Jewish Community and the general support of 
the American public. Will it continue to endure in the future? In the 
final analysis, how far is the United States willing to go in supporting 
the security and survival of Israel? 


Normative studies of possible futures for the US-Israeli relationship 
have been a popular pastime in recent years. The central focus of these 
analyses is normally the role the United States should play in a 
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement and how that role will 
relate to Israeli security and survival. The purpose of this discussion is 
not normative, but, rather, it is to project the most likely future based 
upon the previous analysis of the nature of the US-Israeli relationship 
and objective factors which may be operating in the future 

A final peace settlement is the pivotal issue around which revolves 
the future direction of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the US Israeli 

US-Israeli relations prior to or in the absence of a peace settlement. 
Prior to the achievement of a final peace settlement, little change can 
be expected in the current US role in the Middle East or its relationship 
with Israel. Of all the external states involved in the region, the United 
States probably has the most influence with the Arabs and Israel and, 
according to Egypt’s Anwar Sadat, “holds all the cards” in the Middle 
East. A formal US bilateral treaty with Israel in conjunction with a 
multilateral guarantee of peace terms has been suggested by many, 
including J. W. Fulbright.55 Going still further, Richard Ullman has 
suggested a formal US-Israeli treaty which would include the stationing 
of US troops in Israel as a credible guarantee of peace.** However, 
formalizing the relationship with Israel by an explicit treaty of 
guarantee in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied 
territories as inducement for peace negotiations would clearly limit US 
diplomatic freedom of maneuver and remove the trust the Arabs have 



in her. In addition, as Stanley Hoffman has observed, such a treaty of 
guarantee could become a substitute for a settlement and would give 
Israel a lien on US Middle East policy 57 Futhermore, a very likely 
Arab response to such a treaty would be to seek formal commitments 
from the Soviet Union, possibly including military forces, which would 
then place the superpowers in a confrontation situation which both 
seek to avoid. However, the current situation of “no war, no peace” 
cannot exist indefinitely. The political, economic, and military 
dependence of Israel on the United States is undesirable and unpopular 
in both countries. In fact, the alleged possession of nuclear weapons can 
be viewed as an attempt by Israel to establish its independence in the 
final analysis, and Robert Tucker has suggested that the United States 
should encourage and assist the development of an Israeli nuclear 
deterrent as an effective means of reducing dependence on the United 
States. 58 The Israelis pride themselves on their independence and seek 
to stand alone. The role of dependent is detrimental to their national 
pride and is likely, if prolonged, to create increased domestic political 
conflict and instability. In the United States, Israeli dependence over a 
prolonged period will also have detrimental impact on the special 
relationship. The economic burden can and probably will be sustained 
as long as the American public discerns an Israeli interest in reaching a 
peace settlement. Intransigence, however, would seriously undermine 
Israeli support even in the American Jewish Community. Therefore, 
over a prolonged period of no peace and no war, US support would 
probably decline dramatically unless the Israelis were successful in 
convincing the American public that the lack of peace was no fault of 

There is growing evidence that a fifth round of the Arab-lsraeli 
conflict is becoming increasingly possible, despite an apparent interest 
by all parties concerned in resuming the Geneva peace conference- If 
another war occurs, the US-Israeli relationship will be severely strained 
because of the likely increase in the economic and military burden on 
the United States. Further drawdowns from war reserve stockpiles 
would be required thus creating an increased risk for US military 
readiness. Most polls support the conclusion of the January 197S Harris 
poll that the US public favors economic and military equipment 
support but does not favor use of US military forces to protect 
Israel. 5 9 US public opinion polls, however, usually reflect emotional 
rather than rational, reasoned responses and they are highly dependent 
upon the prevailing situation. In addition, they can be influenced by 


the national leadenhip. Therefore, a poll taken with Israel under attack 
in a conflict in which they were not the perpetrators would probably 
reflect a public willingness to send troops. If Israel’s survival were 
deemed by the United States to be in jeopardy, US air and naval power 
would probably be considered immediately by the President. US 
ground forces would be introduced only as a last resort. In view of the 
dynamic factors operating on the US-Israeli relationship, congressional 
consent would very possibly be afforded. 

US-Ismeii relations and a final peace settlement A final peace 
settlement will most likely involve significant readjustment of the 
present Israeli borders and the establishment of a Palestinian political 
entity. No attempt will be made here to suggest the details of such a 
settlement. However, a major consideration in the achievement of this 
settlement will, of necessity, involve provisions for the security and 
legitimization of the State of Israel <md the new Palestinian entity. 
Because the credibility of any signed treaty between the Arabs and 
Israel is likely to be low, credible external guarantees of its provisions 
will be necessary. Henry Kissinger acknowledged this fact when he 
stated that any final peace settlement “will undoubtedly require for its 
enforcement some international and-in my view, very probably- some 
American guarantees.” 60 The inherent instability of hostile states with 
traditional and deeply-rooted animosities living as neighbors; the 
insecurity of Israel; and the strong US desire for peace in the region will 
drive the United States into a more direct involvement with Israel and 
the Arab states in the region. The need to extend guarantees as part of 
or as supplements to the settlement will probably strengthen the 
US-Israeli connection and the nature of the foundation of the 
relationship discussed previously will serve to support the establishment 
of US guarantees. 

Alan Dowty and N. A. Pelcovits have done extensive studies of the 
possibilities for implementing security guarantees in the Middle East. 
While Pelcovits believes that bilateral and international assurances could 
reinforce a settlement at the proper time, Dowty suggests that 
multilateral guarantees offer the best option as opposed to unilateral or 
joint guarantees by the superpowers. 61 Others have recommended the 
unilateral introduction of US military forces or joint US-USSR military 
forces to serve in peace-keeping or peace-enforcing roles as part of a 
guarantee for final settlement. 62 However, the introduction of forces 
by the great powers would have the effect of localizing their global 
rivalry and increasing the threat of confrontation and conflict. 

Furthermore, a joint superpower guarantee would give each the power 
to veto or obstruct action, which would, in effect, negate the guarantee. 
The necessity to involve the superpowers, especially the United States, 
is generally acknowledged by all parties involved. Although the United 
States exercises the greatest influence with both Arabs and Israelis, at 
least minimal participation in the final settlement by the Soviet Union 
is required in order to secure a stable agreement. While both 
superpowers must be involved, to some extent, in the creation of the 
final agreement, the recognized limitations and risks of unilateral and 
joint superpower guarantees require that the implementation of 
guarantees be multilateral. Such multilateral guarantees must be 
supported by a broad variety of states which have a direct interest in 
the maintenance of the peace treaty. Although international guarantees 
of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the states involved will 
probably be a part of the settlement, Israeli distrust of external powers, 
fostered by her historical experience in the international community, 
will cause her to turn to the only power she Uusts (the United States) 
for explicit supplemental guarantees for her security and sovereignty. 
While the United States will probably continue to resist formalizing its 
commitment to Israel, explicit guarantees for continued military 
assistance, to include limited use of US military forces in the event of 
the failure of multilateral guarantees, will probably be made at the 
Executive level. To preclude reciprocal Soviet action, the United States 
could also offer similar guarantees to the involved Arab states. If this 
step is unsuccessful and the Soviets succeed in establishing bilateral 
guarantees, formal or informal, with the Arab states, the situation 
would become unstable and the risk of superpower confrontation could 

A peace settlement will not be immediately stable. Arms transfers 
will probably continue to both sides and, until control of this complex 
issue can be implemented, the threat to regional peace will continue to 
require US military assistance to Israel to ensure her capability for 
self-defense. In addition, the animosities existing between Arabs and 
Israelis will only subside over an extended period of peace. Therefore, 
regional political and economic cooperation between the Arabs and 
Israelis will probably not be effective for a considerable period and 
Israeli economic dependency on the United States will probably 
continue for the foreseeable future. 


The US-Israeli connection has been an open-ended, informal, and 


contradictory association which has proven to be increasingly strong 
and durable-possibly unbreakable- for the past three decades. Based 
upon strong ideological, political, economic, military, cultural, and 
moral linkages, the relationship has created a basic US foreign policy 

^Tt _tha ‘ ° f reconcUin 8 conflicting US national interests in the 
Middle East. That dilemma has consistently been resolved in favor of 
preserving the “special relationship” between the two states and the 
forseeable trend in US-lsraeU relations is for a continued and perhaps 
closer association in the future. 



1. Thomas Griffith, “How Deep is the US Commitment to Israel?" Time, 

October 29, 1973, p. 71. „ _ , , 

2. Robert Keatley, “Our Nervous Alliance with Israel, Wall Street Journal, 

June 24, 1975, p. 18. . __ „„„ 

3. Department of State Bulletin, No. 1618, June 29, 1970, p. 790. 

4. Department of State Bulletin, No. 1841, October 7, 1974, p. 468. 

5. For a more detailed account of the early evolution of US support for the 
Zionists see Howard M. Sacker, The Course of Modem Jewish History, New York: 
Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1958; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, New 
York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1969; Evan M. Wilson, “The American Interest 
in die Palestine Question and the Establishment of Israel,” The Annals, Vol 401, 
May 1972, pp. 64-73; and Walter Lacquer, A History of Zionism, New York: 
Holt, Winston and Rinehart, Inc., 1972. 

6. Acheson, p. 233. 

7 For a more detailed elaboration of Soviet objectives in the Middle fcaset 
see Soviet Objectives in the Middle East, London: Institute for the Study of 
Conflict, January 1974 and M. Confino and S. Shamir, eds., The USSR and the 
Middle East, Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1973. 

8. William R. Polk, The United States and the Arab World, 3d ed., 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 366. 

9. J. C. Hurewitz, “Superpower Rivalry and the Arab-Istaeli Dispute: 
Involvement or Commitment?" in The USSR and the Middle East, ed. by M. 
Confino and S. Shamir, pp. 162-163. 

10. Brookings Institution, Toward Peace in the Middle East, pp. 5-6. 

11. US Agency for International Development (USAID), US Overseas Loans 
and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-June 

30 ' Department of State Bulletin, No. 1900, November 24, 1975, p. 721. 

13. Brookings Institution, p. 5. 

14. Department of State Bulletin, No. 1881, July 14, 1975, p. 54. 

15. Department of State Bulletin, No. 1892, September 29, 1975, p. 460. 

16. J. W. Fulbright, Beyond the Interim Agreement, text of keynote address 
before 29th Annual Conference of the Middle East Institute, October 3, 1975, p. 


17. J. W. Fulbright, “Energy and the Middle East,” Vital Speeches of the Day, 

March 15, 1975, p. 331. ^ w 

18. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, New York and London: The Macmillan 

Co., 1973, pp. 341-348. 

19. Foreign Policy Recarch Association, Great Decisions 76, p. 8. 

20. Edward R. F. Sheehan, “Step By Step in the Middle East,” Foreign Policy, 
Spring 1976, p. 21. 

21. Fulbright, Beyond the Interim Agreement, p. 4. 

22. Fulbright, “Energy and the Middle East,” p. 333. 

23. Franz Shurman, The Logic of World Power, New York: Pantheon Books, 
1974, p. 534. 

24. Ibid. 

• PPWII '->> "W-...I * i»4J. .p^--^^^-p..M.m«!-iW PU J | . W |...l W i.:.. W ,^»., JJ . l ..l» W .|..^. M p 

25. Depmtment of State Bulletin, No. 1880, July 13, 1975, pp. 9-10. 

26. Department of State Bulletin, No. 1892, September 29, 1975, pp. 

27. Polk, p.437. 

28. US Congress, Senate, Committee an Foreign Relations, Emergency 
Military Assistance for Israel and Cambodia, Hearings, 93rd Congress., 1st Session, 
Washington: GPO, 1973, pp. 137-139. 

29. "American Jews and Israel,” Time, March 10, 1975, p. 24. 

30. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 129. 

31. “Israel’s Lobby,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, August 30, 
1975, pp. 1871-1875. 

32. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Israel’s Lobbying,” The Washington 
Post, November 10, 1975, p. C7. 

33. “Israel’s Lobby,” Congresional Quarterly Weekly Report, p. 1875. 

34. Tom Wicker, “Erosion Need Not be Fatal,” The New York Times, 
February 16, 1975, p. 15E. 

35. Louis Harris, “Oil or Israel?,” The New York Times Magazine, April 6, 
1975, p. 21. 

36. Department of State Bulletin, No. 1872, May 12, 1975, p. 610. 

37. “American Jews and Israel,” Time, p. 24. 

38. Keatley, p. 18. 

39. Harry B. Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East, New York: Ronald Press Co., 
1960, p. 93. 

40. Sheehan, p. 67. 

41. US Department of Commerce, Overseas Buaness Reports, OBR 75-47, 
November 1975, p. 3. 

42. USAID, p. 17. 

43. Bernard Gwertzman, “US Plans to Cut 1977 Aid to Israel,” The New York 
Times, January 27, 1976, p. 1. 

44. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, pp. 60-71. 

45. USAID, p. 17. 

46. Department of State Bulletin, No. 1913, February 23, 1976, p. 221. 

47. Ibid, p. 471. 

48. Ezekiel 37:21-22 (Revised Standard Version). 

49. Obadiah 1 : 2 (Revised Standard Version). 

50. Zechariah 12:9 (Revised Standard Version). 

51. “Talk of the Town,” The New Yorker, February 2, 1976, p. 25. 

52. Department of State Bulletin, No. 1863, March 10, 1975, p. 284. 

53. J. W. Fulbright, “American Interests in the Middle East,” The Washington 
Post, July 7, 1975, p. 3. See also Fulbright speech, “The Clear and Present 
Danger,” Vital Speeches of the Day, December 1, 1974, p. 105. 

54. Department of State Bulletin, No. 1928, June 7, 1976, p. 721. 

55. J. W. Fulbright, “American Interests in the Middle East, p. 3. 

56. Richard H. Ullman, “Alliance with Israel,” Foreign Policy, Summer 1975, 
p. 21. See also his “After Rabat: Middle East Risks and American Roles," Foreign 
Affairs, January 1975, pp. 284ff. 

57. Stanley Hoffman, “A New Policy for Israel,” Foreign Affairs, April 1975, 
p. 414. 

58. Robert W. Tucker, “Israel and the United States: From Dependence to 
Nuclear Weapons?,” Commentary, November 1975, pp. 38-43. 


59. Harris, p. 23. 

60. Department of State Bulletin, No. 1881, July 14, 1975, p. 62. 

61. Alan Dowty, “The Application of International Guarantees to the 
Egypt-Iinel Conflict,” The Journal of Conflict Retolution, June 1972, pp. 
264-266 and N. A. Pelcowits, Security Guarantees in a Middle East Settlement, 
1976, p. 55. 

62. For a discussion of Soviet guarantees, see Abraham Becker, Moscow and 
The Middle East Settlement: A Role For Soviet Guarantees?, Santa Monica: Rand 
Corporation, October 1975. 


Brookings Institution. Toward Peace in the Middle Eatt, Washington: 1975. 

Bryzinski, Zbrignieu, et at., “Peace in An International Framework.” Foreign 
Policy, No. 19, Summer 1975, pp. 3-17. 

Confino, M. and Shamir, S., eds. The USSR and the Middle Eatt. Jerusalem: Israel 
Univerrities Press, 1973. 

Dowty, Alan. “The Application of International Guarantees to the Egypt-1 trael 
Conflict” The Journal of Conflict Retoludon, VoL 16, No. 2, June 1972, pp. 

Draper, Theodore. “The United States and Israel: Tilt in die Middle East?” 
Commentary. VoL 59, No. 4, April 1975, pp. 29-45. 

Griffith, Thomas. “How Deep is the US Commitment to Israel?” Thru, October 
29, 1973, p. 76. 

Harris, Louis. “Oil or Israel?” The New York Timet Magazine, April 6, 1975, pp. 

Hoffman, Stanley. “A New Policy for IsraeL” Foreign Afftirt, VoL 53, No. 3, 
April 1975, pp. 405431. 

Gelb, Leslie. “If Israel Totters, Will the US Reach Out?” The New York Timet, 
December 1, 1974, p. 2E. 

Keatley, Robert “Our Nervous Alliance with IsraeL” Wall Street Journal, June 
24, 1975, p. 18. 

M organ thau, Hans. “The Geopolitics of Israel’s SurvivaL” The New Leader, VoL 
56, No. 25, December 24, 1973, pp. 4-6. 

Pelcovits, N. A. Security Guaranteet in a Midtie Eatt Settlement. Foreign Policy 
Papers, VoL 2, No. 5, Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976. 

Safran, Nadav. “Engagement in the Middle East" Foreign Affairs, VoL 53, No. 1, 
October 1974, pp. 45-63. 

Sheehan, Edward. “Step By Step in the Middle East.” Foreign Policy, No. 22, 
Spring 1976, pp. 3-70. 

Tucker, Robert W. “Israel and the United States: From Dependence to Nuclear 
Weapons?” Commentary, VoL 60, No. 5, November 1975, pp. 2943. 

Ullman, Richard H. “After Rabat: Middle East Risks and American Roles” 
Foreign Affairt, VoL 53, No. 2, January 1975, pp. 284-296. 

UUman, Richard H. “Alliance with IsraeL” Foreign Policy, No. 19, Summer 1975, 
pp. 18-33. 



Detente, National Security, and Multinational Coiporatiom 
Nonconaonant Detente and NATO 
Deterrence and Detente 

The Impact of Criies on the Evolution of Strategy and Foteet 
in an Era of Detente 

The Tenor Trap 

AD A013S22 
AD A013979 

AD A0141SS 
AD A0141S9 

CoBective Defenae, Neutralization, and rite Balance of Power 
Contending Security Pobciet in Southeaat Aria 

Prociaon Guided Munitions: Implications for Detente 

Chile, 1964*74: The Successes and Failures of Reformism 

International Leadership in an Era of Detente 

Detente and the Eastern Mediterranean 

Terrorism and the Military Response 

The Prospects of Soviet American Alliance 

A Fifth Round in the Middle East? Western European Perceptions 

Nuclear Strategy for Defending a Border 

Being Number One Nation: Primacy and Detente 

Interests and Strategies in an Era of Detente: An Overview 

The Relevance of Civilian Based Defense to US Security Interests 

AD A01S464 
AD AO 15465 
AD A015466 
AD AO 15467 
AD AO 16859 
AD A016860 
AD A016884 
AD A017049 
AD A017050 
AD A017794 
AD A019091 
AD A020178 

Copies of any of these memoranda may be obtained from the Defense 
Documentation Center. The request, indicating title and AD number, should be 
sent to the following address: 

Defense Documentation Center 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, VA 22314 


ACN 76055 %/ 

i !3E 


Howard L. /Chambers 

Strategic Studies Institute 
US Army War College 
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013 


Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 

nvrweuTioM st axemen t ft *• • 

KEY fONM (Cm ill— m ww w «Mi « mmm t m* iMwtffp *r Mm* 

US- Israeli "special relationship"; security guarantees; bilateral guarantees; 
multilateral guarantees; comprehensive peace settlement; US-lsraeli bilateral 
treaty; American** Israel I Public Affairs Committee; US commitment; Arab-lsraell 
disputes; American Jewish Community 

i u 

i m M. 

The US**lsraeli "special relationships has drawn the United States into a 
closer and more direct involvement In the Middle East. This memorandum analyzes 
the basis for the US-lsraell connection and various plausible options for the 
form and structure of future US- Israel I relations. The author indicates that, 

In the absence of a comprehensive peace settlement, formalization of the relatlo 
Is unlikely In order to retain US flexibility with both Arabs and Israelis. 
However, ultimately, some form of formal US bilateral alliance may evolve. 

tomom or i nov wno 


ay \ f . 

"" / 72A J 

possibly Involving US military forces in conjunction with a final peace settle- 
ment. Such a bilateral arrangement would be supplemental to a multilateral 
guarantee Involving both “superpowers" and perhaps UN peace observers. In any 
case, he concludes unless Israel undermines Its American public support, the 
US-lsraell connection will continue to be very close, and perhaps even grow 

Lt 7 3 £ 



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